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Madalina Croitoru1, Srdjan Vesic2⋆
1INRIA, LIRMM, Univ. Montpellier 2, France; 2CRIL - CNRS, France
Abstract. The area of inconsistent ontological knowledge base query answer-
ing studies the problem of inferring from an inconsistent ontology. To deal with
such a situation, different semantics have been defined in the literature (e.g. AR,
IAR, ICR). Argumentation theory can also be used to draw conclusions under
inconsistency. Given a set of arguments and attacks between them, one applies a
particular semantics (e.g. stable, preferred, grounded) to calculate the sets of ac-
cepted arguments and conclusions. However, it is not clear what are the similari-
ties and differences of semantics from ontological knowledge base query answer-
ing and semantics from argumentation theory. This paper provides the answer to
that question. Namely, we prove that: (1) sceptical acceptance under stable and
preferred semantics corresponds to ICR semantics; (2) universal acceptance un-
der stable and preferred semantics corresponds to AR semantics; (3) acceptance
under grounded semantics corresponds to IAR semantics. We also prove that the
argumentation framework we define satisfies the rationality postulates (e.g. con-
sistency, closure).
1 Introduction
Ontological knowledge base query answering problem has received renewed interest in
the knowledge representation community (and especially in the Semantic Web domain
where it is known as the ontology based data access problem [17]). It considers a con-
sistent ontological knowledge base (made from facts and rules) and aims to answer if
a query is entailed by the knowledge base (KB). Recently, this question was also con-
sidered in the case where the KB is inconsistent [16, 8]. Maximal consistent subsets of
the KB, called repairs, are then considered and different semantics (based on classical
entailment on repairs) are proposed in order to compute the set of accepted formulae.
Argumentation theory is also a well-known method for dealing with inconsistent
knowledge [5, 2]. Logic-based argumentation [6] considers constructing arguments from
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inconsistent knowledge bases, identifying attacks between them and selecting accept-
able arguments and their conclusions. In order to know which arguments to accept, one
applies a particular argumentation semantics.
This paper starts from the observation that both inconsistent ontological KB query
answering and instantiated argumentation theory deal with the same issue, which is
reasoning under inconsistent information. Furthermore, both communities have several
mechanisms to select acceptable conclusions and they both call them semantics. The
research questions one could immediately ask are: Is there a link between the seman-
tics used in inconsistent ontological KB query answering and those from argumentation
theory? Is it possible to instantiate Dung’s ([15]) abstract argumentation theory in a way
to implement the existing semantics from ontological KB query answering? If so, which
semantics from ontological KB query answering correspond to which semantics from
argumentation theory? Does the proposed instantiation of Dung’s abstract argumenta-
tion theory satisfy the rationality postulates [10]?
There are several benefits from answering those questions. First, it would allow
to import some results from argumentation theory to ontological query answering and
vice versa, and more generally open the way to the Argumentation Web [19]. Second,
it might be possible to use these results in order to explain to users how repairs are con-
structed and why a particular conclusion holds in a given semantics by constructing and
evaluating arguments in favour of different conclusions [14]. Also, on a more theoreti-
cal side, proving a link between argumentation theory and the results in the knowledge
representation community would be a step forward in understanding the expressibility
of Dung’s abstract theory for logic based argumentation [21].
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the ontological query answering
problem is explained and the logical language used throughout the paper is introduced.
The end of this section introduces the existing semantics proposed in the literature to
deal with inconsistent knowledge bases. Then, in Section 3, we define the basics of
argumentation theory. Section 4 proves the links between the extensions obtained un-
der different argumentation semantics in this instantiated logical argumentation setting
and the repairs of the ontological knowledge base. We show the equivalence between
the semantics from inconsistent ontological KB query answering area and those de-
fined in argumentation theory in Section 5. Furthermore, the argumentation framework
thus defined respects the rationality postulates (Section 6). The paper concludes with
Section 7.
2 Ontological Conjunctive Query Answering
The main goal of section is to introduce the syntax and semantics of the SRClanguage
[3, 4], which is used in this paper due to its relevance in the context of the ontological
KB query answering.
Note that the goal of the present paper is not to change or criticise the definitions
from this area; we simply present the existing work. Our goal is to study the link be-
tween the existing work in this area and the existing work in argumentation theory. In
the following, we give a general setting knowledge representation language which can
then be instantiated according to properties on rules or constraints and yield equivalent
languages to those used by [16] and [8].
A knowledge base is a 3-tuple K = (F ,R,N ) composed of three finite sets of
formulae: a set F of facts, a set R of rules and a set N of constraints. Let us formally
define what we accept as F ,R and N .
Facts Syntax. Let C be a set of constants and P = P1 ∪ P2 . . . ∪ Pn a set of
predicates of the corresponding arity i = 1, . . . , n. Let V be a countably infinite set of
variables. We define the set of terms by T = V ∪ C. As usual, given i ∈ {1 . . . n},
p ∈ Pi and t1, . . . , ti ∈ Twe call p(t1, . . . , ti) an atom. If γ is an atom or a conjunction
of atoms, we denote by var(γ) the set of variables in γ and by term(γ) the set of
terms in γ. A fact is the existential closure of an atom or an existential closure of a
conjunction of atoms. (Note that there is no negation or disjunction in the facts.) As an
example, considerC = {Tom},P = P1∪P2, with P1 = {cat,mouse}, P2 = {eats}
and V = {x1, x2, x3, . . .}. Then, cat(Tom), eats(Tom, x1) are examples of atoms
and γ = cat(Tom) ∧mouse(x1) ∧ eats(Tom, x1) is an example of a conjunction of
atoms. It holds that var(γ) = {x1} and term(γ) = {Tom, x1}. As an example of a
fact, consider ∃x1(cat(Tom) ∧mouse(x1) ∧ eats(Tom, x1)).
An interpretation is a pair I = (△, .I) where △ is the interpretation domain (pos-
sibly infinite) and .I , the interpretation function, satisfies:
1. For all c ∈ C, we have cI ∈ △,
2. For all i and for all p ∈ Pi, we have p
I ⊆ △i,
3. If c, c′ ∈ C and c 6= c′ then cI 6= c′I .
Note that the third constraint specifies that constants with different names map to
different elements of∆.
Let γ be an atom or a conjunction of atoms or a fact. We say that γ is true under
interpretation I iff there is a function ι which maps the terms (variables and constants)
of γ into △ such that for all constants c, it holds that ι(c) = cI and for all atoms
p(t1, ...ti) appearing in γ, it holds that (ι(t1), ..., ι(ti)) ∈ p
I . For a set F containing
any combination of atoms, conjunctions of atoms and facts, we say that F is true under
interpretation I iff there is a function ι which maps the terms (variables and constants)
of all formulae in F into △ such that for all constants c, it holds that ι(c) = cI and
for all atoms p(t1, ...ti) appearing in formulae of F , it holds that (ι(t1), ..., ι(ti)) ∈
pI . Note that this means that for example sets F1 = {∃x(cat(x) ∧ dog(x))} and
F2 = {∃x(cat(x)), ∃x(dog(x))} are true under exactly the same set of interpretations.
Namely, in both cases, variable x is mapped to an object of∆. On the other hand, there
are some interpretations under which set F3 = {∃x1(cat(x1)), ∃x2(dog(x2))} is true
whereas F1 and F2 are not.
If γ is true in I we say that I is a model of γ. Let γ′ be an atom, a conjunction
of atoms or a fact. We say that γ is a logical consequence of γ′ (γ′ entails γ, denoted
γ′ |= γ) iff all models of γ are models of γ′. If a set F is true in I we say that I
is a model of F . We say that a formula γ is a logical consequence of a set F (denoted
F |= γ) iff all models of F are models of γ. We say that a setG is a logical consequence
of set F (denoted F |= G) if and only if all models of F are models of G. We say that
two sets F and G are logically equivalent (denoted F ≡ G) if and only if F |= G and
G |= F .
Given a set of variables X and a set of terms T, a substitution σ of X by T is
a mapping from X to T (denoted σ : X → T). Given an atom or a conjunction of
atoms γ, σ(γ) denotes the expression obtained from γ by replacing each occurrence of
x ∈ X ∩ var(γ) by σ(x). If a fact F is the existential closure of a conjunction γ then
we define σ(F ) as the existential closure of σ(γ). Finally, let us define homomorphism.
Let F and F ′ be atoms, conjunctions of atoms or facts (it is not necessarily the case
that F and F ′ are of the same type, e.g. F can be an atom and F ′ a conjunction of
atoms). Let σ be a substitution such that σ : var(F ) → term(F ′). We say that σ is
a homomorphism from F to F ′ if and only if the set of atoms appearing in σ(F ) is
a subset of the set of atoms appearing in σ(F ′). For example, let F = cat(x1) and
F ′ = cat(Tom)∧mouse(Jerry). Let σ : var(F )→ term(F ′) be a substitution such
that σ(x1) = Tom. Then, σ is a homomorphism from F to F
′ since the atoms in σ(F )
are {cat(Tom)} and the atoms in σ(F ′) are {cat(Tom),mouse(Jerry)}.
Note that it well is known that F ′ |= F if and only if there is a homomorphism from
F to F ′ [12].
Rules. A rule R is a formula ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn ∀y1, . . . , ∀ym (H(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . ,
ym)→ ∃z1, ...∃zk C(y1, . . . , ym, z1, ...zk)) where H , the hypothesis, and C, the con-
clusion, are atoms or conjunctions of atoms, n,m, k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, x1, . . . , xn are the
variables appearing in H , y1, . . . , ym are the variables appearing in both H and C
and z1, . . . , zk the new variables introduced in the conclusion. As two examples of
rules, consider ∀x1(cat(x1) → miaw(x1)) or ∀x1((mouse(x1) → ∃z1(cat(z1) ∧
eats(z1, x1))).
Reasoning consists of applying rules on the set and thus inferring new knowledge. A
ruleR = (H,C) is applicable to setF if and only if there existsF ′ ⊆ F such that there
is a homomorphism σ from the hypothesis of R to the conjunction of elements of F ′.
For example, rule ∀x1(cat(x1) → miaw(x1)) is applicable to set {cat(Tom)}, since
there is a homomorphism from cat(x1) to cat(Tom). If rule R is applicable to set F ,
the application of R to F according to pi produces a set F ∪ {pi(C)}. In our example,
the produced set is {cat(Tom),miaw(Tom)}. We then say that the new set (which
includes the old one and adds the new information to it) is an immediate derivation of
F byR. This new set is often denoted byR(F ). Thus, applying a rule on a set produces
a new set.
Let F be a subset ofF and letR be a set of rules. A set Fn is called anR-derivation
of F if there is a sequence of sets (called a derivation sequence) (F0, F1, . . . , Fn) such
that:
– F0 ⊆ F
– F0 isR-consistent
– for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, it holds that Fi is an immediate derivation of Fi−1
– (no formula inFn contains a conjunction andFn is an immediate derivation ofFn−1)
or Fn is obtained from Fn−1 by conjunction elimination.
Conjunction elimination is the following procedure: while there exists at least one
conjunction in at least one formula, take an arbitrary formula ϕ containing a conjunc-
tion. If ϕ is of the form ϕ = ψ ∧ ψ′ then exchange it with two formulae ψ and ψ′. If
ϕ is of the form ∃x(ψ ∧ ψ′) then exchange it with two formulae ∃x(ψ) and ∃x(ψ′).
The idea is just to start with anR-consistent set and apply (some of the) rules. The only
technical detail is that the conjunctions are eliminated from the final result. So if the
last set in a sequence does not contain conjunctions, nothing is done. Else, we eliminate
those conjunctions. This technicality is needed in order to stay as close as possible to
the procedures used in the literature in the case when the knowledge base is consistent.
Given a set {F0, . . . , Fk} ⊆ F and a set of rules R, the closure of {F0, . . . , Fk}
with respect to R, denoted ClR({F0, . . . , Fk}), is defined as the smallest set (with
respect to ⊆) which contains {F0, . . . , Fk}, and is closed for R-derivation (that is, for
every R-derivation Fn of {F0, . . . , Fk}, we have Fn ⊆ ClR({F0, . . . , Fk})). Finally,
we say that a set F and a set of rulesR entail a factG (and we write F ,R |= G) iff the
closure of the facts by all the rules entails F (i.e. if ClR(F) |= G).
As an example, consider a set of facts F = {cat(Tom), small(Tom)} and the rule
set R = {R1 = ∀x1(cat(x1) → miaw(x1) ∧ animal(x1)), R2 = ∀x1(miaw(x1) ∧
small(x1) → cute(x1))}. Then, F0, F1, F2 is a derivation sequence, where F0 =
{cat(Tom), small(Tom)}, F1 = R1(F0) = {cat(Tom), small(Tom), miaw(Tom)
∧animal(Tom)}, F2 = {cat(Tom), small(Tom), miaw(Tom) ∧ animal(Tom),
cute(Tom)} and F3 = {cat(Tom), small(Tom), miaw(Tom), animal(Tom),
cute(Tom)}.
We conclude the presentation on rules in SRC by a remark on performing union on
facts when they are viewed as sets of atoms. In order to preserve semantics the union is
done by renaming variables. For example, let us consider a fact F1 = {∃xcat(x)} and
a fact F2 = {∃xanimal(x)}. Then the fact F = F1 ∪ F2 is the union of the two fact
after variable naming has been performed: F = {∃x1cat(x1), ∃x2animal(x2)}.
Constraints. A constraint is a formula ∀x1 . . . ∀ xn (H(x1, . . . , xn)→ ⊥), where
H is an atom or a conjunction of atoms and n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Equivalently, a constraint
can be written as ¬(∃x1, ..., ∃xnH(x1, ...xn)). As an example of a constraint, consider
∀x1(cat(x1)∧dog(x1)→ ⊥).H(x1, . . . , xn) is called the hypothesis of the constraint.
Given a knowledge base K = (F ,R,N ), a set {F1, . . . , Fk} ⊆ F is said to be in-
consistent if and only if there exists a constraintN ∈ N such that {F1, . . . , Fk} |= HN ,
where HN denotes the existential closure of the hypothesis of N . A set is consistent if
and only if it is not inconsistent. A set {F1, . . . , Fk} ⊆ F isR-inconsistent if and only
if there exists a constraint N ∈ N such that ClR({F1, . . . , Fk}) |= HN , where HN
denotes the existential closure of the hypothesis of N .
A set of facts is said to be R-consistent if and only if it is not R-inconsistent. A
knowledge base (F ,R,N ) is said to be consistent if and only if F is R-consistent. A
knowledge base is inconsistent if and only if it is not consistent.
Example 1. Let us consider the following knowledge base K = (F ,R,N ), with: F =
{cat(Tom), bark(Tom)}, R = {∀x1(cat(x1) → miaw(x1))}, N = {∀x1(bark(x1)
∧miaw(x1) → ⊥)}. The only rule in the knowledge base is applicable to the set
{cat(Tom), bark(Tom)} and its immediate derivation produces the set {cat(Tom),
bark(Tom),miaw(Tom)}. We see that ClR(F) |= ∃x1(bark(x1)∧miaw(x1)), thus
the KB is inconsistent.
Given a knowledge base, one can ask a conjunctive query in order to know whether
something holds or not. Without loss of generality we consider in this paper boolean
conjunctive queries (which are facts). As an example of a query, take ∃x1cat(x1). The
answer to query α is positive if and only if F ,R |= α.
2.1 Query Answering over Inconsistent Ontological Knowledge Bases
Notice that (like in classical logic), if a knowledge base K = (F ,R,N ) is inconsis-
tent, then everything is entailed from it. In other words, every query is true. Thus, the
approach we described until now is not robust enough to deal with inconsistent infor-
mation. However, there are cases when the knowledge base is inconsistent; this phe-
nomenon has attracted particular attention during the recent years [8, 16]. For example,
the set F may be obtained by combining several sets of facts, coming from different
agents. In this paper, we study a general case when K is inconsistent without making
any hypotheses about the origin of this inconsistency. Thus, our results can be applied
to an inconsistent base independently of how it is obtained.
A common solution [8, 16] is to construct maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
consistent subsets of K. Such subsets are called repairs. Formally, given a knowledge
base K = (F ,R,N ), define:
Repair(K) = {F ′ ⊆ F | F ′ is maximal for ⊆ R-consistent set}
We nowmention a very important technical detail. In some papers, a set of formulae
is identified with the conjunction of those formulae. This is not of particular significance
when the knowledge base is consistent. However, in case of an inconsistent knowl-
edge base, this makes a big difference. Consider for example K1 = (F1,R1,N1) with
F1 = {dog(Tom), cat(Tom)}, R1 = ∅ and N1 = {∀x1(dog(x1) ∧ cat(x1) → ⊥)},
compared with K2 = (F2,R2,N2) with F2 = {dog(Tom) ∧ cat(Tom)}, R2 = ∅
and N2 = {∀x1(dog(x1) ∧ cat(x1) → ⊥)}. In this case, according to the definition
of a repair, K1 would have two repairs and K2 would have no repairs at all. We could
proceed like this, but we find it confusing given the existing literature in this area. This
is why, in order to be completely precise, from now on we suppose that F does not
contain conjunctions. Namely, F is supposed to be a set composed of of atoms and of
existential closures of atoms. One could believe that this reduces the expressibility of
the language, consider for example F1 = {∃x(dog(x)), ∃x(black(x))} as opposed to
F2 = {∃x(dog(x) ∧ black(x))}. Namely, in classical first order logic, F1 and F2 do
not have the same models. However, in SRC, F1 and F2 have the same models (see the
definition of an interpretation).
Once the repairs calculated, there are different ways to calculate the set of facts that
follow from an inconsistent knowledge base. For example, we may want to accept a
query if it is entailed in all repairs (AR semantics).
Definition 1. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base and let α be a query. Then α is
AR-entailed from K, written K |=AR α iff for every repair A
′ ∈ Repair(K), it holds
that ClR(A
′) |= α.
Another possibility is to check whether the query is entailed from the intersection
of closed repairs (ICR semantics).
Definition 2. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base and let α be a query. Then α is
ICR-entailed from K, written K |=ICR α iff
⋂
A′∈Repair(K) ClR(A
′) |= α.
Example 2 (Example 1 Cont.). Repair(K) = {R1, R2} with R1 = {cat(Tom)}
and R2 = {bark(Tom)}}. ClR(R1) = {cat(Tom),miaw(Tom)}, ClR(R2) =
{bark(Tom)}. It is not the case that K |=ICR cat(Tom).
Finally, another possibility is to consider the intersection of all repairs and then
close this intersection under the rules (IAR semantics).
Definition 3. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base and let α be a query. Then α is
IAR-entailed from K, written K |=IAR α iff ClR(
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)) |= α.
The three semantics can yield different results [16, 8], as illustrated by the next two
examples.
Example 3. (ICR and IAR different from AR) Consider K = (F ,R,N ), with: F =
{havecat(Tom), haveMouse(Jerry)}, intuitively, we have a cat (called Tom) and a
mouse (called Jerry);R = {∀x1 (haveCat(x1)→ haveAnimal(x1)),
∀x2 (haveMouse(x2)→ haveAnimal(x2))}; N = {∀x1∀x2(haveCat(x1)
∧haveMouse(x2)→ ⊥)}, meaning that we cannot have both a cat and a mouse (since
the cat would eat the mouse). There are two repairs: R1 = {haveCat(Tom)} and
R2 = {haveMouse(Jerry)}. ClR(R1) = {haveCat(Tom), haveAnimal(Tom)}
and ClR(R2) = {haveMouse(Jerry), haveAnimal(Jerry)}. Consider a query α =
∃x1 haveAnimal(x1) asking whether we have an animal. It holds thatK |=AR α since
ClR(R1) |= α and ClR |= α, but neither K |=ICR α (since ClR(R1)∩ClR(R2) = ∅)
nor K |=IAR α (since R1 ∩R2 = ∅).
Example 4. (AR and ICR different from IAR) Consider K = (F ,R,N ), with: F =
{cat(Tom), dog(Tom)},R = {∀x1(cat(x1)→ animal(x1)),
∀x2(dog(x2)→ animal(x2))}, N = {∀x(cat(x) ∧ dog(x)→ ⊥)}.
We haveRepair(K) = {R1, R2}withR1 = {cat(Tom)} andR2 = {dog(Tom)}.
ClR(R1) = {cat(Tom), animal(Tom)}, ClR(R2) = {dog(Tom), animal(Tom)}.
It is not the case that K |=IAR ∃x(animal(x)) (since R1
⋂
R2 = ∅). However,
K |=AR ∃x(animal(x)). This is due to the fact that ClR(R1) |= ∃x(animal(x))
and ClR(R2) |= ∃x(animal(x)). Also, we have K |=ICR ∃x(animal(x)) since
ClR(R1) ∩ ClR(R2) = {animal(Tom)}.
3 Argumentation over Inconsistent Ontological Knowledge Bases
This section shows that it is possible to define an instantiation of Dung’s abstract ar-
gumentation theory [15] that can be used to reason with an inconsistent ontological
KB.
We first define the notion of an argument. For a set of formulae G = {G1, . . . , Gn},
notation
∧
G is used as an abbreviation for G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn.
Definition 4. Given a knowledge base K = (F ,R,N ), an argument a is a tuple a =
(F0, F1, . . . , Fn) where:
– (F0, . . . , Fn−1) is a derivation sequence with respect to K
– Fn is an atom, a conjunction of atoms, the existential closure of an atom or the exis-
tential closure of a conjunction of atoms such that Fn−1 |= Fn.
Example 5 (Example 2 Cont.).Consider a = ({cat(Tom)}, {cat(Tom),miaw(Tom)},
miaw(Tom)) and b = ({bark(Tom)}, bark(Tom)) as two examples of arguments.
This is a straightforward way to define an argument when dealing with SRClanguage,
since this way, an argument corresponds to a derivation.
To simplify the notation, from now on, we suppose that we are given a fixed knowl-
edge base K = (F ,R,N ) and do not explicitly mention F , R nor N if not neces-
sary. Let a = (F0, ..., Fn) be an argument. Then, we denote Supp(a) = F0 and
Conc(a) = Fn. Let S ⊆ F a set of facts, Arg(S) is defined as the set of all ar-
guments a such that Supp(a) ⊆ S. Note that the set Arg(S) is also dependent on
the set of rules and the set of constraints, but for simplicity reasons, we do not write
Arg(S,R,N ) when it is clear to which K = (F ,R,N ) we refer to. Finally, let E be
a set of arguments. The base of E is defined as the union of the argument supports:
Base(E) =
⋃
a∈E Supp(a).
Arguments may attack each other, which is captured by a binary attack relation
Att ⊆ Arg(F)×Arg(F). Recall that the repairs are the subsets of F while the setR is
always taken as a whole. This means that the authors of the semantics used to deal with
an inconsistent ontological KB envisage the set of facts as inconsistent and the set of
rules as consistent. When it comes to the attack relation, this means that we only need
the so called “assumption attack” since, roughly speaking, all the inconsistency “comes
from the facts”.
Definition 5. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base and let a and b be two argu-
ments. The argument a attacks argument b, denoted (a, b) ∈ Att, if and only if there
exists ϕ ∈ Supp(b) such that the set {Conc(a), ϕ} isR-inconsistent.
This attack relation is not symmetric. To see why, consider the following example.
Let F = {p(m), q(m), r(m)},R = ∅, N = {∀x1(p(x1) ∧ q(x1) ∧ r(x1)→ ⊥)}. Let
a = ({p(m), q(m)}, p(m) ∧ q(m)), b = ({r(m)}, r(m)). We have (a, b) ∈ Att and
(b, a) /∈ Att. Note that using attack relations which are not symmetric is very common
in argumentation literature. Moreover, symmetric attack relation have been criticised
for violating some desirable properties [1].
Definition 6. Given a knowledge base K = (F ,R,N ), the corresponding argumenta-
tion frameworkAFK is a pair (A = Arg(F), Att)whereA is the set of arguments that
can be constructed from F and Att is the corresponding attack relation as specified in
Definition 5.
Let E ⊆ A and a ∈ A. We say that E is conflict free iff there exists no arguments
a, b ∈ E such that (a, b) ∈ Att. E defends a iff for every argument b ∈ A, if we have
(b, a) ∈ Att then there exists c ∈ E such that (c, b) ∈ Att.
E is admissible iff it is conflict free and defends all its arguments. E is a complete
extension iff E is an admissible set which contains all the arguments it defends. E is a
preferred extension iff it is maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible set. E is
a stable extension iff it is conflict-free and for all a ∈ A \ E , there exists an argument
b ∈ E such that (b, a) ∈ Att.
E is a grounded extension iff E is a minimal (for set inclusion) complete extension.
If a semantics returns exactly one extension for every argumentation framework,
then it is called a single-extension semantics.
For an argumentation framework AS = (A, Att) we denote by Extx(AS) (or by
Extx(A, Att)) the set of its extensions with respect to semantics x. We use the abbrevia-
tions c, p, s, and g for respectively complete, preferred, stable and grounded semantics.
An argument is sceptically accepted if it is in all extensions, credulously accepted if
it is in at least one extension and rejected if it is not in any extension.
Finally, we introduce two definitions allowing us to reason over such an argumen-
tation framework. The output of an argumentation framework is usually defined [10,
Definition 12] as the set of conclusions that appear in all the extensions (under a given
semantics).
Definition 7 (Output of an argumentation framework). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a
knowledge base and AFK the corresponding argumentation framework. The output of
AFK under semantics x is defined as:
Outputx(AFK) =
⋂
E∈Extx(AFK)
Concs(E).
In the degenerate case when Extx(AFK) = ∅, we define Output(AFK) = ∅ by
convention.
Note that the previous definition asks for existence of a conclusion in every exten-
sion. This kind of acceptance is usually referred to as sceptical acceptance. We say that
a query α is sceptically accepted if it is a logical consequence of the output of AFK :
Definition 8 (Sceptical acceptance of a query). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge
base and AFK the corresponding argumentation framework. A query α is sceptically
accepted under semantics x if and only if Outputx(AFK) |= α.
It is possible to make an alternative definition, which uses the notion of universal ac-
ceptance instead of sceptical one. According to universal criteria, a query α is accepted
if it is a logical consequence of conclusions of every extension:
Definition 9 (Universal acceptance of a query). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge
base and AFK the corresponding argumentation framework. A query α is universally
accepted under semantics x if and only if for every extension Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), it
holds that Concs(Ei) |= α.
In general, universal and sceptical acceptance of a query do not coincide. Take for
instance the KB from Example 3, construct the corresponding argumentation frame-
work, and compare the sets of universally and sceptically accepted queries under pre-
ferred semantics.
Note that for single-extension semantics (e.g. grounded), the notions of sceptical
and universal acceptance coincide. So we simply use word “accepted” in this context.
Definition 10 (Acceptance of a query). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base,
AFK the corresponding argumentation framework, x a single-extension semantics and
let E be the unique extension of AFK . A query α is accepted under semantics x if and
only if Concs(E) |= α.
4 Equivalence between Repairs and Extensions
In this section, we prove two links between the repairs of an ontological KB and the
corresponding argumentation framework: Theorem 1 shows that the repairs of the KB
correspond exactly to the stable (and preferred, since in this instantiation the stable and
the preferred semantics coincide) extensions of the argumentation framework; Theorem
2 proves that the intersection of all the repairs of the KB corresponds to the grounded
extension of the argumentation framework.
Theorem 1. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base, AFK the corresponding argu-
mentation framework and x ∈ {s, p}1. Then:
Extx(AFK) = {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}
Proof. The plan of the proof is as follows:
1. We prove that {Arg(A′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)} ⊆ Exts(AFK).
2. We prove that Extp(AFK) ⊆ {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}.
3. Since every stable extension is a preferred one [15], we can proceed as follows.
From the first item, we have that {Arg(A′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)} ⊆ Extp(AFK),
thus the theorem holds for preferred semantics. From the second item we have that
Exts(AFK) ⊆ {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}, thus the theorem holds for stable
semantics.
1. We first show {Arg(A′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)} ⊆ Exts(AFK). Let A
′ ∈ Repair(K)
and let E = Arg(A′). Let us prove that E is a stable extension of (Arg(F), Att).
We first prove that E is conflict-free. By means of contradiction we suppose the
contrary, i.e. let a, b ∈ E such that (a, b) ∈ Att. From the definition of attack, there
exists ϕ ∈ Supp(b) such that {Conc(a), ϕ} is R-inconsistent. Thus Supp(a) ∪ {ϕ}
is R-inconsistent; consequently A′ is R-inconsistent, contradiction. Therefore E is
conflict-free.
Let us now prove that E attacks all arguments outside the set. Let b ∈ Arg(F) \
Arg(A′) and let ϕ ∈ Supp(b), such that ϕ /∈ A′. Let A′c be the set obtained from A
′
by conjunction elimination and let a = (A′, A′c,
∧
A′c). We have ϕ /∈ A
′, so, due to
the set inclusion maximality for the repairs, {
∧
A′c, ϕ} isR-inconsistent. Therefore,
(a, b) ∈ Att. Consequently, E is a stable extension.
2. We now need to prove that Extp(AFK) ⊆ {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}. Let
E ∈ Extp(AFK) and let us prove that there exists a repairA
′ such that E = Arg(A′).
Let S = Base(E). Let us prove that S is R-consistent. Aiming to a contradiction,
suppose that S is R-inconsistent. Let S′ ⊆ S be such that (1) S′ is R-inconsistent
and (2) every proper set of S′ is R-consistent. Let us denote S′ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn}.
Let a ∈ E be an argument such that ϕn ∈ Supp(a). Let S
′
c be the set obtained from
S′ \ {ϕ} by conjunction elimination and let a′ = (S′ \ {ϕn}, S
′
c,
∧
S′c). We have
that (a′, a) ∈ Att. Since E is conflict free, then a′ /∈ E . Since E is an admissible
set, there exists b ∈ E such that (b, a′) ∈ Att. Since b attacks a′ then there exists
1 Recall that s stands for stable and p for preferred semantics.
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} such that {Conc(b), ϕi} isR-inconsistent. Since ϕi ∈ Base(E),
then there exists c ∈ E such that ϕi ∈ Supp(c). Thus (b, c) ∈ Att, contradiction. So
it must be that S isR-consistent.
Let us now prove that there exists no S′ ⊆ F such that S ( S′ and S′ is R-
consistent. We use the proof by contradiction. Thus, suppose that S is not a maximal
R-consistent subset of F . Then, there exists S′ ∈ Repair(K), such that S ( S′. We
have that E ⊆ Arg(S), since S = Base(E). Denote E ′ = Arg(S′). Since S ( S′
then Arg(S) ( E ′. Thus, E ( E ′. From the first part of the proof, E ′ ∈ Exts(AFK).
Consequently, E ′ ∈ Extp(AFK). We also know that E ∈ Extp(AFK). Contradic-
tion, since no preferred set can be a proper subset of another preferred set. Thus, we
conclude that Base(E) ∈ Repair(K).
Let us show that E = Arg(Base(E)). It must be that E ⊆ Arg(S). Also, we know
(from the first part) that Arg(S) is a stable and a preferred extension, thus the case
E ( Arg(s) is not possible.
3. Nowwe know that {Arg(A′) |A′ ∈ Repair(K)} ⊆ Exts(AFK) and Extp(AFK) ⊆
{Arg(A′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}. The theorem follows from those two facts, as ex-
plained at the beginning of the proof.
To prove Theorem 2, we first prove the following lemma which says that if there
are no rejected arguments under preferred semantics, then the grounded extension is
equal to the intersection of all preferred extensions. Note that this result holds for every
argumentation framework (not only for the one studied in this paper, where arguments
are constructed from an ontological knowledge base). Thus, we only suppose that we
are given a set and a binary relation on it (called attack relation).
Lemma 1. Let AS = (A, Att) be an argumentation framework and GE its grounded
extension.
If A ⊆
⋃
Ei∈Extp(AS)
Ei then GE =
⋂
Ei∈Extp(AS)
Ei.
Proof. Let Iope = ∩Ei∈Extp(AS)Ei denote the intersection of all preferred extensions.
It is known [15] the GE ⊆ Iope. Let us prove that in the case when there are no rejected
arguments, it also holds the Iope ⊆ GE. Let a ∈ Iope. Let us show that no argument b
attacks a. This holds since every argument b is in at least one preferred extension, say
Ei, and a is also in Ei (since a is in all preferred extensions) thus b does not attack a since
both a and b are in Ei and Ei is a conflict-free set (since it is a preferred extension). All
this means that arguments in Iope are not attacked. Consequently, they must all belong
to the grounded extension. In other words, Iope ⊆ GE.
We can now, using the previous result, prove the link between the intersection of
repairs and the grounded extension.
Theorem 2. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base and AFK the corresponding
argumentation framework. Denote the grounded extension of AFK by GE. Then:
GE = Arg(
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)
A′).
Proof. Denote the intersection of all repairs by Ioar =
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)A
′ and the
intersection of all preferred extensions by Iope =
⋂
Ei∈Extp(AFK)
Ei. From Theorem
1, we know that Extx(AFK) = {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}. Consequently,
Iope =
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)
Arg(A′) (1)
Since every argument has an R-consistent support, then its support is in at least one
repair. From Theorem 1, that argument is in at least one preferred extension, (i.e. it is
not rejected). From Lemma 1,
Iope = GE (2)
From (1) and (2), we obtain that
GE =
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)
Arg(A′) (3)
Note that for every collection S1, . . . , Sn of of sets of formulae, we have Arg(S1) ∩
. . .∩ Arg(Sn) = Arg(S1 ∩ . . .∩Sn). By applying this rule on the set of all repairs, we
obtain: ⋂
A′∈Repair(K)
Arg(A′) = Arg(Ioar) (4)
From (3) and (4), we obtain GE = Arg(Ioar) which ends the proof.
5 Semantics Equivalence
This section presents the main result of the paper. It proves the links between semantics
from argumentation theory (stable, preferred, grounded) and semantics from inconsis-
tent ontology KB query answering (ICR, AR, IAR). More precisely, we show that: (1)
sceptical acceptance under stable and preferred semantics corresponds to ICR seman-
tics; (2) universal acceptance under stable and preferred semantics corresponds to AR
semantics; (3) acceptance under grounded semantics corresponds to IAR semantics.
The proof of Theorem 3 is based on Theorem 1 and the proof of Theorem 4 is derived
from Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base, let AFK be the corresponding
argumentation framework and let α be a query. Let x ∈ {s, p} be stable or preferred
semantics. Then:
– K |=ICR α iff α is sceptically accepted under semantics x.
– K |=AR α iff α is universally accepted under semantics x.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies Extx(Arg(F), Att) = {Arg(A
′) | A′ ∈ Repair(K)}. In
fact, the restriction of function Arg on Repair(K) is a bijection between Repair(K)
and Extx(AFK). Note also that for every query α, for every repair A
′, we have that
ClR(A
′) |= α if and only if Concs(Arg(A′)) |= α. By using those two facts, the result
of the theorem can be obtained as follows:
– For every query α, we have: K |=ICR α if and only if
⋂
A′∈Repair(K) ClR(A
′) |= α
if and only if
⋂
Ei∈Extx(AFK)
Concs(Ei) |= α if and only if Outputx(AFK) |= α if
and only if α is sceptically accepted.
– For every query α, we have: K |=AR α if and only if for every A
′ ∈ Repair(K),
ClR(A
′) |= α if and only if for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), Concs(Ei) |= α if and only
if α is universally accepted.
Theorem 4. Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base, let AFK be the corresponding
argumentation framework and let α be a query. Then:
K |=IAR α iff α is accepted under grounded semantics.
Proof. Let us denote the grounded extension of AFK by GE and the intersection of all
repairs by Ioar =
⋂
A′∈Repair(K)A
′. From Definition 10, we have:
α is accepted under grounded semantics iff Concs(GE) |= α. (5)
From Theorem 2, we have:
GE = Arg(Ioar). (6)
Note also that for every set of facts {F1, . . . , Fn} and for every query α, we have that
ClR({F1, . . . , Fn}) |= α if and only if Concs(Arg({F1, . . . , Fn})) |= α. Thus,
ClR(Ioar) |= α if and only if Concs(Arg(Ioar)) |= α. (7)
From (6) and (7) we have that:
ClR(Ioar) |= α if and only if Concs(GE) |= α. (8)
From Definition 3, one obtains:
ClR(Ioar) |= α if and only if K |=IAR α. (9)
The theorem now follows from (5), (8) and (9).
6 Postulates
In this section, we prove that the framework we propose in this paper satisfies the ra-
tionality postulates for instantiated argumentation frameworks [10]. We first prove the
indirect consistency postulate.
Proposition 1 (Indirect consistency). LetK = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base,AFK
the corresponding argumentation framework and x ∈ {s, p, g}. Then:
– for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), ClR(Concs(Ei)) is a consistent set
– ClR(Outputx(AFK)) is a consistent set.
Proof.
– Let Ei be a stable or a preferred extension of AFK . From Theorem 1, there exists a
repair A′ ∈ Repair(K) such that Ei = Arg(A
′). Note that Concs(Ei) = ClR(A
′) ∪
{α | ClR(A) |= α} (this follows directly from Definition 4). Consequently, the set of
R-derivations of Concs(Ei) and the set of R-derivations of ClR(A
′) coincide. For-
mally, ClR(ClR(A
′)) = ClR(Concs(Ei)). Since ClR is idempotent, this means that
ClR(A
′) = ClR(Concs(Ei)). Since ClR(A
′) is consistent, then ClR(Concs(Ei)) is
consistent.
Let us now consider the case of grounded semantics. Denote GE the grounded ex-
tension of AFK . We have just seen that for every Ei ∈ Extp(AFK), it holds that
ClR(Concs(Ei)) is a consistent set. Since the grounded extension is a subset of the
intersection of all the preferred extensions [15], and since there is at least one pre-
ferred extension, say E1, then GE ⊆ E1. Since ClR(Concs(Ei)) is consistent then
ClR(Concs(GE)) is also consistent.
– Consider the case of stable or preferred semantics. Let us prove ClR(Outputx(AFK))
is a consistent set. Recall that Outputx(AFK) =
⋂
Ei∈Extx(AFK)
Concs(Ei). Since
every knowledge base has at least one repair then, according to Theorem 1, there
is at least one stable or preferred extension Ei. From Definition 7, we have that
Outputx(AFK) ⊆ Concs(Ei). Concs(Ei) is R-consistent thus Outputx(AFK) is
R-consistent. In other words, ClR(Outputx(AFK)) is consistent.
Note that in the case of grounded semantics the second part of the proposition follows
directly from the first one, since ClR(Outputg(AFK)) = ClR(Concs(GE)).
Since our instantiation satisfies indirect consistency then it also satisfies direct con-
sistency. This comes from R-consistency definition; namely, if a set is R-consistent,
then it is necessarily consistent. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Direct consistency). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base, AFK
the corresponding argumentation framework and x ∈ {s, p, g}. Then:
– for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), Concs(Ei) is a consistent set
– Outputx(AFK) is a consistent set.
We now also prove that the present argumentation formalism also satisfies the clo-
sure postulate.
Proposition 2 (Closure). Let K = (F ,R,N ) be a knowledge base, AFK the corre-
sponding argumentation framework and x ∈ {s, p, g}. Then:
– for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), Concs(Ei) = ClR(Concs(Ei)).
– Outputx(AFK) = ClR(Outputx(AFK)).
Proof.
– From the definition of ClR, we see that Concs(Ei) ⊆ ClR(Concs(Ei)). Let us prove
that ClR(Concs(Ei)) ⊆ Concs(Ei). Suppose that α ∈ ClR(Concs(Ei)). This means
that there exists α1, . . . , αk ∈ Concs(Ei) and that there exists a derivation sequence
F0, . . . , Fn such that F0 = {α1, . . . , αk} and α ∈ Fn. Note that from Proposition
1, we know that {α1, . . . , αk} is R-consistent. Since α1, . . . , αk ∈ Concs(Ei) then
there exist a1, . . . , ak ∈ Ei such that Conc(a1) = α1, . . . , Conc(ak) = αk. Thus,
there exists an argument a such that Supp(a) = Supp(a1) ∪ . . . ∪ Supp(ak) and
Conc(a) = α. Since Ei is a preferred, a stable or the grounded extension, Theorems 1
and 2 imply that there exists a set of formulae S such that Ei = Arg(S). Consequently,
Ei = Arg(Base(Ei)). From this observation and since Supp(a) ⊆ Base(Ei), we
conclude that a ∈ Ei. Thus, α ∈ Concs(Ei), which ends the proof.
– In the case of grounded semantics, the result holds directly from the first part of the
proposition. The reminder of the proof considers stable or preferred semantics. From
the definition of ClR, Outputx(AFK) ⊆ ClR(Outputx(AFK)). So we only need
to prove that ClR(Outputx(AFK)) ⊆ Outputx(AFK).
Let α ∈ ClR(Outputx(AFK)). Then there exist α1, . . . , αk ∈ Outputx(AFK)
such that there is a derivation sequence F0, . . . , Fn such that F0 = {α1, . . . , αk} and
α ∈ Fn. Since α1, . . . , αk ∈ Outputx(AFK) then for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), we
have α1, . . . , αk ∈ Ei. Therefore for every Ei ∈ Extx(AFK), α ∈ ClR(Concs(Ei)).
From the first part of the proof, ClR(Concs(Ei)) = Concs(Ei). Thus, for every Ei ∈
Extx(AFK), α ∈ Concs(Ei). This means that α ∈ Outputx(AFK).
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates the links between the semantics used in argumentation theory
and those from the inconsistent ontological KB query answering.
Contribution of the paper. First, we show that it is possible to instantiate Dung’s
abstract argumentation theory in a way to deal with inconsistency in an ontological
KB. Second, we formally prove the links between the semantics from ontological KB
query answering and those from argumentation theory: ICR semantics corresponds to
sceptical acceptance under stable or preferred argumentation semantics, AR semantics
corresponds to universal acceptance under stable / preferred argumentation semantics
and IAR semantics corresponds to acceptance under grounded argumentation seman-
tics. Third, we show that the instantiation we define satisfies the rationality postulates.
The fourth contribution of the paper is to make a bridge between the argumentation
community and the knowledge representation community in this context, allowing for
future exchanges.
Applications of our work. The first possible application of our work is to import
some results about semantics and acceptance from argumentation to ontological KB
query answering and vice versa. Second, arguments can be used for explanatory pur-
poses. In other words, we can use arguments and counter arguments to graphically rep-
resent and explain why different points of view are conflicting or not and why certain ar-
gument is (not) in all extensions. However, we suppose that the user understands the no-
tion of logical consequence under first order logic when it comes to consistent data. For
example, we suppose that the user is able to understand that if cat(Tom)∧miaw(Tom)
is present in the set, then queries cat(Tom) and ∃xcat(x) are both true. To sum up, we
suppose that the other methods are used to explain reasoning under consistent knowl-
edge and we use argumentation to explain reasoning under inconsistent knowledge.
Related work. Note that this is the first work studying the link between semantics
used in argumentation (stable, preferred, grounded) and semantics used in inconsis-
tent ontological knowledge base query answering (AR, IAR, ICR). There is not much
related work. However, we review some papers that study similar issues.
For instance, the link between maximal consistent subsets of a knowledge base
and stable extensions of the corresponding argumentation system was shown by Cayrol
[11]. That was the first work showing this type of connection between argument-based
and non argument-based reasoning. This result was generalised [20] by studying the
whole class of argumentation systems corresponding to maximal consistent subsets of
the propositional knowledge base. The link between the ASPIC system [18] and the
Argument Interchange Format (AIF) ontology [13] has recently been studied [7]. An-
other related paper comprises constructing an argumentation framework with ontolog-
ical knowledge allowing two agents to discuss the answer to queries concerning their
knowledge (even if it is inconsistent) without one agent having to copy all of their on-
tology to the other [9]. While those papers are in the area of our paper, none of them is
related to the study of the links between different semantics for inconsistent ontological
KB query answering and different argumentation semantics.s
Future work. We plan to answer different questions, like: Can other semantics
from argumentation theory yield different results? Are those results useful for inconsis-
tent ontological KB query answering? What happens in the case when preferences are
present? What is the link between having preferences on databases and having prefer-
ences on arguments? More generally speaking, we want to examine how the knowledge
representation community could benefit from other results from argumentation theory
and whether the argumentation community could use some open problems in the knowl-
edge representation as inspiration for future work.
References
1. L. Amgoud and P. Besnard. Bridging the gap between abstract argumentation systems and
logic. In International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management (SUM’09), pages
12–27, 2009.
2. L. Amgoud and C. Cayrol. Inferring from inconsistency in preference-based argumentation
frameworks. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 29 (2):125–169, 2002.
3. J.-F. Baget andM.-L. Mugnier. The Complexity of Rules and Constraints. JAIR, 16:425–465,
2002.
4. J.-F. Baget, M.-L. Mugnier, S. Rudolph, and M. Thomazo. Walking the complexity lines
for generalized guarded existential rules. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (IJCAI’11), pages 712–717, 2011.
5. S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, and H. Prade. Argumentative inference in uncertain and incon-
sistent knowledge bases. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
intelligence (UAI’93), pages 411–419, 1993.
6. P. Besnard and A. Hunter. Elements of Argumentation. MIT Press, 2008.
7. F. J. Bex, S. J. Modgil, H. Prakken, and C. Reed. On logical specifications of the argument
interchange format. Journal of Logic and Computation, page In Press, 2013.
8. M. Bienvenu. On the complexity of consistent query answering in the presence of simple
ontologies. In Proc of AAAI, 2012.
9. E. Black, A. Hunter, and J. Z. Pan. An argument-based approach to using multiple ontologies.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management
(SUM’09), pages 68–79. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
10. M. Caminada and L. Amgoud. On the evaluation of argumentation formalisms. Artificial
Intelligence Journal, 171 (5-6):286–310, 2007.
11. C. Cayrol. On the relation between argumentation and non-monotonic coherence-based en-
tailment. In Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI’95), pages 1443–1448, 1995.
12. M. Chein and M.-L. Mugnier. Graph-based Knowledge Representation and Reasoning—
Computational Foundations of Conceptual Graphs. Advanced Information and Knowledge
Processing. Springer, 2009.
13. C. Chesnevar, J. McGinnis, S. Modgil, I. Rahwan, C. Reed, G. Simari, M. South,
G. Vreeswijk, and S. Willmott. Towards an argument interchange format. Knowledge Engi-
neering Review, 21(4):293–316, 2006.
14. J. Dix, S. Parsons, H. Prakken, and G. R. Simari. Research challenges for argumentation.
Computer Science - R&D, 23(1):27–34, 2009.
15. P. M. Dung. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic
reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence Journal, 77:321–
357, 1995.
16. D. Lembo, M. Lenzerini, R. Rosati, M. Ruzzi, and D. F. Savo. Inconsistency-tolerant seman-
tics for description logics. In Proc. of RR, pages 103–117, 2010.
17. M. Lenzerini. Data integration: A theoretical perspective. In Proc. of PODS 2002, 2002.
18. S. J. Modgil and H. Prakken. A general account of argumentation with preferences. Artificial
Intelligence Journal, page In Press, 2013.
19. I. Rahwan, F. Zablith, and C. Reed. Laying the foundations for a world wide argument web.
Artificial Intelligence, 171(10-15):897–921, 2007.
20. S. Vesic. Maxi-consistent operators in argumentation. In 20th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’12), pages 810–815, 2012.
21. S. Vesic and L. van der Torre. Beyond maxi-consistent argumentation operators. In 13th
European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA’12), pages 424–436, 2012.
